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Abstract
In this paper we want to stress the
relevance of decision aid procedures
in complex decision making prob-
lems and claim for an extra effort
in order to develop appropriate rep-
resentation tools when fuzzy criteria
or objectives are present. In particu-
lar, we point out how some painting
algorithms may help decision mak-
ers to understand problems subject
to fuzziness based upon a graphical
first approach, like Statistics use to
do. Moreover, we point out that al-
though the standard communication
tool with machines are either data or
words, we should also consider cer-
tain families of graphics for such a
role, mainly for the output.
Keywords: Multicriteria decision
making, decision aid, criteria repre-
sentation, fuzzy sets.
1 Introduction
When Zadeh [34] introduced fuzzy sets he
was postulating the existence of certain uncer-
tainty decision makers use to deal with which
needed a more appropriate and efficient rep-
resentation than the only existing model for
uncertainty, i.e., probability theory. A big sci-
entific dispute was declared with Bayesian ap-
proach to probability, since they claim fuzzi-
ness and any other kind of uncertainty can
be consistently represented according to their
model (see, e.g., [5, 6, 13, 22, 23, 27, 32] but
also [8, 9, 20, 35] and a personal view in [26]).
No matter if we accept or not the axioms of
the Bayesian approach, leading towards the
existence of a unique representation of uncer-
tainty, the true fact is that most students and
even many researchers do not know about any
alternative representation for uncertainty.
This situation is a consequence of a more im-
portant issue: most people do not know about
any other formal alternative to binary logic
which represents, together with observation,
a key pilar of present Science [25].
We can recall here philosopher Francis Ba-
con when he wrote that ”those who have han-
dled the sciences have been either empiricists
or dogmatists. Empiricists are like ants, who
only collect things and make use of them. Ra-
tionalists are like spiders, who weave webs out
of their own bodies. But the bee has a middle
policy: it extracts material from the flowers
of the gardens and meadows, and digests and
transforms it by its own powers.”
The problem we want to stress first in this
paper is that experiments still need a logical
structure behind, so it is not so clear that
experiments are in one side and logic is on
the other side. Experiments are usually built
in order to answer certain questions provided
within a particular logic, and the way we ob-
serve and understand reality depends on a
logic previously defined.
Then we shall stress that any decision aid tool
needs a protocol for communication with hu-
man being. Quite often this protocol is as-
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sumed within a linguistic framework, but we
may be forgetting that part of the success of
Statistics is based upon the great explanatory
potential some simple graphic have.
2 Experiments and probability
Perhaps the main success of Statistics is quite
concentrated in two fields mathematicians do
not care too much about: the design of exper-
iments and what is usually called Descriptive
Statistics. The first one represents the first
stage of any statistical study, and the second
one appears once those experiments have been
run.
Design of experiments tells how reality must
be observed in order to maximize information,
at the same time that cost is being reduced
(this is actually done by means of a sometimes
quite boring mathematical reckoning).
But Descriptive Statistics pretends a simpli-
fied global view of data, of course subject to
manipulation and frequent errors. It is sur-
prising how some complex situations are eas-
ily explained with a simple standard statisti-
cal graphic.
A key argument to be pointed out is how
Probability Theory is fully consistent with bi-
nary logic: uncertainty is about observability
of certain event, but not about the event itself
(we may not know if such an event happened
or not, but for sure either the event hap-
pens or the event does not happens). Hence,
those experiments Statistics talk about are
conceived and designed according to such a
binary logic.
At this point, it is interesting to note that
most introductory books to Probability The-
ory assume that the experimental space Ω has
been someway given (see, for example, [11]),
so events (that define a Boolean algebra ac-
cording to binary operators and, or and no)
can be represented in terms of subsets of that
experimental space, which looks like a regular
set but it is defined as a set of possible results
during an experiment (so, it is not a regular
set).
On the contrary, a consistent approach to Kol-
mogorov [21] can be based upon events, sim-
ply assuming the existence of a set representa-
tion (which can be assured as soon the struc-
ture of events is being assumed to follow the
Boolean structure, see [33]).
But even in this case, an appropriate exper-
iment should be built in such a way that
we can have an answer to every question we
make, does event A holds when I get result ω
during the experiment? And according to the
assumed binary logic, only one of two answers
is allowed: yes or no.
Once binary logic is being assumed, events
have to be crisp in the above sense. Defining
a different kind of experiments, subject to an
alternative non-binary logic, should be a main
objective of fuzzy researchers in order to build
the new Science being claimed by those soft
sciences where most information is given in
linguistic terms rather than Set Theory terms.
3 Complex decision making
problems and decision aiding
Complex decision making problems are deeply
related to the above discussion, once they are
not confused with difficult decision making
problems.
By a difficult decision making problem we
mean here those problems that have been or
can be modelled in terms of a classical op-
timization problem, where basic information
fits into a real space: we may find of course
that the optimal solution does not exist, per-
haps because there is an inner conflict be-
tween criteria or objectives. But obtaining
an informative output about the true situa-
tion hinges simply on our reckoning capacity.
We just need faster algorithms.
By a complex decision making problem we
mean here a problem where basic informa-
tion is subject to deep modelling uncertain-
ties. Criteria or objectives are poorly defined
or simply not provided, and they have to be
estimated from the available information, per-
haps linguistic preferences. Any classical ap-
proximation to such this kind of problems is
subject to an essential criticism, most often
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because a linguistic term is forced to fit into
a crisp representation.
Complexity in our context refers to modelling,
no matter if the proposed model is difficult or
not to solve.
Within such a modelling complexity in this
paper we stress the relevance of two problems,
respectively located at both sides of any deci-
sion aid procedure, in between such a proce-
dure and decision makers:
• Estimation of criteria or objectives from
preferences, for a better knowledge of de-
cision maker’s mind.
• Graphical representation of results, for
a better knowledge of possible conse-
quences of decision maker’s alternatives.
4 Estimation of criteria or
objectives from preferences
A typical complex situation is when the basic
information is given in terms of preferences.
Decision maker compares a set of given al-
ternatives, which can be poorly defined (as
pointed out in [25], the most important hu-
man alternatives are strategic and therefore
poorly defined, so details are fixed in the very
last moment).
Since in a complex problem it is always desir-
able that our model allows the possibility of
creating new alternatives, initially not taken
into account (see [28, 31]), understanding the
space were these alternatives move is essen-
tial.
In this sense, we can try some kind of decom-
position or representation in terms of some
possible underlying criteria or objectives.
Pursuing this objective, an interesting ap-
proach has been recently proposed by some of
the authors [18, 19] by generalizing the dimen-
sion theory restricted in [10] to partial order
sets. Although more efficient algorithms and
approaches are being investigated, we should
stress that from this approach an alternative
to Saaty’s importance weighting [30] can be
developed (see [15]).
The relevance of this approach is to suggest
decision makers with some hints in order to
understand decision maker’s own mind. Hav-
ing a hint about possible underlying criteria
or objectives should help in the search of new
alternatives.
In Statistics we find tools for reducing data
dimension that can be complementary.
5 Producing graphical
representations
Another key issue is the output decision
maker will get from our decision aid tool.
First of all, we must acknowledge that no deci-
sion maker will accept black boxes, i.e., a ma-
chine telling decision makers what to do, un-
less the proposed model fully fits their mind.
The true objective in a complex decision mak-
ing problem is to help decision makers to un-
derstand the problem they are facing to (see
again [28, 31]).
We should then realize that too often mathe-
matical models use to assume that input and
output are the same kind of information. But
this is not true in most cases, where we give
simple information (the one we as decision
makers have) and we expect some help about
a problem we cannot face, at least directly.
So, we are acknowledging that such a prob-
lem is more complex than the available in-
formation. Why then should we expect that
the output will be similar to the input? If our
data are given in terms of words, we should be
trying a more complex representation frame-
work for the output, rather than the linguistic
one.
A natural more sophisticated framework for
communication is the graphical framework
(which may contain words, at least in their
written form).
Of course, a certain restriction to some singu-
lar kind of graphics is needed, in order to build
up a proper logic within a structured family of
graphical symbols (see [24] for an interesting
discussion within the language structure).
In this context, an interesting approach for
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classification is being developed by some of
the authors in [17, 16] generalizing Ruspini’s
[29] fuzzy partitions [1, 2] in order to produce
representative paintings where colors repre-
senting classes are subject to gradation. The
final objective is to be able to produce similar
graphics to those used in statistics, but allow-
ing color gradation (first results are being ap-
plied in a remote sensing framework, see [14]).
We find here obvious reckoning difficulties, so
a great effort is being made in order to reduce
computing time keeping meaningful outputs.
Improvements are being tested against stan-
dard libraries of figures together with real re-
mote sensing images. For example, the algo-
rithm proposed in [17] can be significatively
improved in time together with the number
of classes under consideration, so pictures will
be more easily manageable.
There is a lot of work ahead under this ap-
proach, deserving in our opinion more inter-
est than too sophisticated tools difficult to be
managed by regular decision makers.
A key characteristic for a revolutionary tool
should be its simplicity.
6 Final comments
In this paper we stress the relevance of aiding
tools for decision making, specifically multi-
criteria problems.
The development of aiding tools represents a
key issue in complex decision making prob-
lems, where the key characteristics and their
relationship use to be difficult to be captured,
measured or described. The amount and the
structure of data (initial or processed) may
represent themselves serious difficulties for a
direct intuition of the problem, not allowing
neither an easy a priori modelling or an easy
a posteriori explanation). In fact, quite often
the deep objective problem in a multicrite-
ria decision making is to find out those crite-
ria which explain present preferences and will
help future decisions. Needless to say, such
criteria may not be representable in the real
line but, on the contrary, they can be poorly
defined [34].
In particular, two key decision aid tools are
considered in this paper. On one hand, those
procedures allowing a better understanding
of decision maker’s mind (pursuing an accu-
rate, significative and suggesting representa-
tion model of the problem). On the other
hand, those procedures allowing a simplified,
significative and suggesting view of possible
results, so that decision maker can understand
the consequences of each decision and even
find some hints about possible new alterna-
tives.
Those two key procedures address the first
and the last stage of any decision aid method-
ology, i.e., the communication between ma-
chine and decision maker. In this sense, we
point out that meanwhile the linguistic sup-
port may be the standard way in which hu-
man beings give information, graphical infor-
mation can be the standard way in which in-
formation is given back to the decision maker.
Certainly, there are additional important
paradigms in complex decision making that
have not being addressed in this paper. For
example, aggregation operators do play a key
role in any summarizing process (see, e.g., [12]
and [4]). In fact, we usually get from the set of
rough data certain significative indices, which
will be quite often the true base for the pos-
terior treatment or representation. Aggrega-
tion operators taking into account operative
reckoning (see, e.g., [3, 7]) and the underlying
structure of data should become a key issue
in the next future (see, e.g., [24]).
But at the end, a picture can be more illustra-
tive than many words, and sometimes we can-
not control the affective pressure words may
represent in decision maker’s mind.
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